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This paper is an exploration of factors impacting police pay. The goal of this paper is 
to isolate the impact of crime on police pay to measure the compensating wage differential 
resulting from on-the-job danger for police officers (as measured by violent crime rates). In 
addition, the analysis allows the estimated compensating differential to vary with the race of 
the individual police officer as well as with the demographic composition of the police 
departments and populations served. Previous work on the determinants of police pay 
informs the analysis, including the empirical measures, regression specification, and control 
variables. 
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LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 is on page 21. This table demonstrates the slopes for the full sample and 
deviation for police from the rest of the sample for various indicators of interest for the 
logarithm of the hourly wage for individuals in the sample. Slopes in green are positive at a 
statistically significant level and slopes in red are negatively so. One asterisk marks 
significance at the 10% level and two asterisks indicates significance at the 5% level.  
Table 2 is on page 23. In this table, the calculations are made for police slopes to be 
directly compared with the full sample instead of just observing the deviation measures. This 
table is primarily included for readability interpretations. The rest of the tables in this paper 
follow the style of Table 1. The markings for significance follow the same rules. 
Table 3 is on page 24. This table divides male and female workers in the full sample 
and in the police occupational category. In this table, the same significance indications from 
Table 1 apply. 
Table 4 is on page 26. This table is the primary findings of this paper. This table 
focuses on a comparison of the returns for various human capital predictors and 
demographic characteristics, as well as the (un)observed compensating wage differential for 
police officers side-by-side with those of administrators and the full sample. 
Table 5 is on page 28-29. This table is large because it is a more detailed breakdown 
of Table 4. In this table, each of the characteristics observed in Table 4 are observed for 
White, Black, and Hispanic individuals. In addition, this table also includes slopes measured 
for any observed relationships between police misrepresentation of Black and Hispanic 
populations affecting the wage of police officers (or the sample as a whole).  
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LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 is on page 9. This figure is a graph depicting the change in violent crime 
rates from period one to period two in relation to the violent crime rates in period one. This 
graph is included to demonstrate that there is not a significant reason to be concerned that 
there are distinct unobserved differences between metropolitan areas that experienced an 
increase in violent crime and those that experienced a decrease in violent crime over the 
interval. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Police officers hold unique positions within their communities. Entrusted with 
protecting their citizens from harm, police officers not only must encounter on-the-job 
danger, but also remain directly responsible for charging headstrong in the direction of such 
danger. This aspect of the job is well understood not only by police officers, but also the 
greater community.  
However, each metropolitan area carries its own level and variety of crime that its 
police are tasked to control. In some of these metropolitan areas, property crimes like theft 
are more common than violent crimes. In other areas, like college campuses, public 
intoxication and minor in possession charges are the mode for police-involved incidents. 
When considering the different types of crimes police respond to as part of their 
jobs, it is plain to see that some crimes make policing an inherently more difficult job than 
others. In particular, when an area has a higher rate of violent crimes (murder, aggravated 
assault, rape, and robbery), policing the area carries more risk to police officers.  
Just as with every job, policing involves wage and non-wage characteristics. Rational 
potential police officers in the labor market value the wage and non-wage characteristics in 
their utility functions and select the job in the location with the highest utility values available 
to them. Included among these non-wage characteristics is the danger level of the job 
potential police officers select. 
This thesis focuses on how on-the-job danger, characterized by local violent crime 
rates, impacts police pay in major metropolitan areas in the United States. In addition, this 
thesis controls for factors that allow for differences between select groups to emerge if any 
significant differences exist in the data set. 
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Question 
 The primary question this thesis addresses is: Does danger impact police pay? This 
paper also examines how the potential effects of danger and returns to human capital gains 
vary across demographic groups. 
Prior Work on Police Pay 
 Because this paper examines police pay, it is important to begin the study with a 
background understanding of what factors are critical to determining pay for police officers 
and forming the foundation of the model to use in this paper. In preparing to study police 
pay, I read a number of papers included in the bibliography of this thesis. The most critical 
source for building a model of police pay came from a paper entitled “Collective Bargaining 
Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation” written by Casey 
Ichniowski, Richard B. Freeman, and Harrison Lauer. In this paper, the author studied the 
effects of successful negotiations for police unions on their job success rate. This author’s 
work provided the backbone for the model of human capital and demographic 
characteristics used in this paper. 
Prior Work on Compensating Wage Differentials 
 Compensating wage differentials result from both a need to fill undesirable jobs and 
a distribution of willingness to take such a job in the labor market. If only a few undesirable 
vacancies need to be filled, then a compensating wage differential may be unnecessary or 
much lower than if a large number of people must be convinced to take an unsavory job. A 
critical informant for this paper’s work on compensating wage differentials is the work of 
Thomas Deleire and Helen Levy and their paper “Worker Sorting and the Risk of Death on 
the Job.” In this paper, I found my first understanding of how compensating wage 
differentials functioned in relation to labor market preferences of employees of different 
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personal characteristics. In this paper, the authors discovered preferences for dangerous jobs 
were different depending on marital and parenthood statuses. For example, they discovered 
that men were more likely to take risky, higher-paying jobs if they had no children or if they 
were married with children than if they were single parents. 
Prior Work on Underrepresentation in Police Forces 
 This paper’s inclusion of a study of the potential impact of departmental 
demographics on pay and compensating wage differentials stems from my reading a diversity 
report on police and their communities from a report called “Diversity on the Force: Where 
Police Don’t Mirror Communities” from the magazine Governing. In this report, major cities 
in the United States were assessed on their diversity representations and a critical indicator to 
evaluate these departments was the gap for different minority groups between population 
and police department representation. 
Time Period and Metropolitan Area Selection 
 In this paper, the time period of interest is 1985-2000. Specifically, this thesis 
analyzes differences between wages in 1990 and 2000 for police and related occupational 
fields. The corresponding crime levels are the five-year periods of 1985-89 and 1995-99, 
respectively. I selected this time period because violent crime rates and changes in violent 
crime rates varied widely across cities with different characteristics. As shown below, there 
was a broad range of changes in violent crime rates among cities in the sample. In the entire 
sample, violent crime rates decreased from period one to period two, but for many of the 
metropolitan areas, the rates increased.  
 In Figure 1 below, the percent change in violent crime is graphed against the 1990 
average (measured from 1985-89) to demonstrate that the changes in violent crime rates did 
not follow a strict pattern according to starting violent crime rates. In particular, the highest 
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initial violent crime rate observed in the sample was in the Atlanta metropolitan area and the 
lowest initial violent crime rate observed was from the Norfolk-Virginia Beach metropolitan 
area. Both of these areas saw little to no change in their violent crime rates between period 
one and period two. The metropolitan areas with the greatest increase and decrease in their 
violent crime rates from period one to period two were Nashville-Davidson and Fort 
Worth-Arlington, respectively. Both of these metropolitan areas had violent crime rate near 
the average for period one. In all, there is a small trend downward for this graph, indicating 
that the metropolitan areas with higher starting crime rates experienced slightly lower 
increases or higher decreases in violent crime rates, on average. However, this is largely 
skewed by a few large cities like New York City sitting at a high initial violent crime rate and 
significant decrease from period one to period two. 
FIGURE 1 
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In the interest of analyzing the finer details of any calculation of a compensating 
wage differential for police officers in the selected major metropolitan areas, this paper also 
examines the compensating wage differential values separately for black, white, and Hispanic 
individuals, as well as separately for males and females.  
In addition, this thesis also tests for significance of a defined variable for the 
disparities of minority representations on police forces. The goal of this inclusion was to see 
if differences in the wages and compensating wage differentials were paid differently to 
departments that more and less nearly mirrored the racial composition of the city. However, 
this goal became more difficult to accomplish as a clear issue with endogeneity and omitted 
variable bias emerged for these indicators. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Compensating Wage Differentials 
This paper applies the theory of compensating wage differentials in the labor market 
for police officers in major metropolitan areas in the United States. Compensating wage 
differentials allow for an understanding of the non-wage characteristics of jobs. When an 
individual chooses to accept a job, he must accept all characteristics of the job.  The location, 
coworkers, noises, health benefits, and even smells of a job can all make a job more or less 
appealing to an individual than another job for equal pay.  
One consequence of individuals’ preferences varying among various job 
characteristics is that if two jobs both pay wage = w0 at competitive equilibrium, but differ in 
a non-pay characteristic N, individuals will select the job with their preferred characteristic. 
In general, when considering jobs that pay C in wages (amount allowing for consumption) 
and have non-pay characteristic N, individuals maximize their Utility according to Eq. 1 and 
their individual alpha (𝛼) based on their affinity (more negative value of 𝛼) or aversion 
(more positive value of 𝛼) to N.  𝐸𝑞 1.     𝑈 = 𝐶 −  𝛼 × 𝑁 
This means that if C is equal for two jobs, an individual will choose the job with 
more desirable non-pay characteristics to maximize utility. For example, if N represents a 
binary variable for the presence (N=1) of a loud, persistent noise at job 1 that is absent 
(N=0) at job 2, then the individual’s preference for or against the loud, persistent noise at his 
place of employment determines which job yields him a higher utility. In the more obvious 
case in which the individual has a positive 𝛼 value to indicate a desire to avoid such a noise, 
the utility from job 2 without the unpleasant noise exceeds the utility from job 1. This 
decision is shown below by comparing 𝑈! and 𝑈! (given that 𝛼 > 0). 
	 12	
𝐸𝑞 2.     𝑈! = 𝐶 −  𝛼 × 1 =  𝐶 −  𝛼 𝐸𝑞 3.     𝑈! = 𝐶 −  𝛼 × 0 = 𝐶 𝐶 > 𝐶 −  𝛼  ∴  𝑈! >  𝑈! 
However, when the two jobs pay different wages, individuals can rationally choose 
the job with the less desirable characteristic if the difference in C is large enough to 
compensate for non-wage components of the jobs. In particular, each individual’s value for 𝛼 determines the exact differential dollar amount that a job with the undesirable 
characteristic must pay to yield the same utility. Consider the loud noise example from 
above, but this time the two jobs pay different wages, 𝐶! for job 1 and 𝐶! for job 2. See 
below (with the same assumption that 𝛼 > 0).  𝑈! =  𝐶! −  𝛼 ×  (0) 𝑈! =  𝐶! −  𝛼 × (1) 𝑈! =  𝑈! =  𝐶! =  𝐶! −  𝛼 𝐶! −  𝐶! =  𝛼 
When comparing two jobs with a binary (N = 0 or N = 1) condition for the non-pay 
characteristic of interest, the difference in compensation (𝐶! −  𝐶!) represents the 
compensating differential necessary to make the individual indifferent between the two jobs. 
In other words, the individual chooses the job with less desirable characteristics if and only if 
the difference in wage is greater than 𝐶! −  𝐶!. 
In this thesis, the non-pay aspect of interest is the violent crime rate in the 
metropolitan area. Individuals who consider and qualify for positions in police departments 
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across the United States express different values of 𝛼 in their employment decisions. 
However, while some individuals considering work as police officers may prefer to work in 
an area with a higher violent crime rate out of nobility or risk-seeking behavior, this thesis 
predicates that police officers in the aggregate will prefer to work in safer metropolitan areas 
hypothesizes that, accounting for other relevant factors, compensation should reflect an 
aversion to policing in areas with higher violent crime rates. Thus, wages should be higher to 
compensate for on-the-job danger of officers policing higher crime areas. 
In this thesis, N is a continuous variable rather than a binary indicator. The next 
section will provide more specification about the qualifications of the data, but the 
importance of this distinction is that the compensating differential amount will not represent 
a simple amount necessary to overcome the binary presence of on-the-job danger. Instead, 
N indicates the degree of danger. With all metropolitan areas experiencing violent crime 
rates greater than zero, 𝛼 will represent a coefficient for the degree of intolerance police 
officers perceive from a higher violent crime rate. Again, the assumption is that each 
individual in the dataset will have a unique value of 𝛼, but the regression methods reveal the 
compensating differential required for higher violent crime rates paid to the marginal worker 
considering a safer work alternative. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Covariates and Data Explained 
Institute for Public Use of Microdata Series 
The backbone of data in this thesis is from the 1990 and 2000 United States Census 
surveys, provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). This includes 
individual characteristics include such exogenous variables as educational attainment, sex, 
race, age, marital status, and metropolitan area of residence. In addition, the primary 
dependent variable of interest for this thesis – log of the hourly income from wages - can be 
sourced to data provided by the 1990 Census and 2000 Census from IPUMS. 
From this backbone, the data was stripped to focus on individuals from metropolitan 
areas surrounding cities of at least 300,000 individuals in 1990. This limitation allowed for 
sufficient observations for meaningful examination from the metropolitan areas included 
and framed the study to focus on 51 metropolitan areas. Additionally, limitations were 
restricted to individuals in comparable occupational classes to police officers. To accomplish 
this restriction, observations were dropped if the individual was self-employed, worked for a 
private for-profit organization, private non-profit organization or the federal government, or 
if the worker’s class was unpaid family labor. Federal employees were removed from the 
dataset because wage changes would likely not be affected by local conditions to any degree 
of significance. 
 Next, individuals were dropped from the dataset if they identified as “Not in Labor 
Force.” These restrictions left local and state employees, including police officers that fell 
into these categories, from the metropolitan areas of the 51 most populous cities for the 
dataset. At this stage, to remove any potential unconventional members of the labor market 
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and for the sake of simplicity, individuals outside the age window of 25-59 years were 
dropped from the sample. 
 After classifying experience levels into categories, educational levels were also 
categorized into meaningful variables. The omitted educational group was any education 
level below a high school diploma. The included groups in the sample were individuals with 
just a high school diploma, individuals with some college experience, individuals with a 
Bachelors degree, and individuals with some educational achievement beyond a bachelors 
degree. By categorizing these educational levels, this paper can assess the wage returns for 
various groups to reaching an additional level of education in comparison to not completing 
high school. 
 Categories for uniform indications of racial characteristics were made based on the 
Census data provided. Any individuals with non-zero values for the detailed Hispanic 
identification category qualified as Hispanic for this paper. Any individuals who did not fit 
that description and identified as “White” for the single race identification were categorized 
as “White” for this paper. Finally, any individuals who identified their singular race as 
“Black” were categorized as such for the purposes of this paper.  As a result, any individual 
in the “White” category was only in this category, but there were some individuals who fell 
into both the “Hispanic” and “Black” categories. Originally a category was made for “Asian” 
individuals in the sample, but once Honolulu was removed from the sample for not fitting 
one of the later requirements, there were not any metropolitan areas left with “Asian” 
populations exceeding 20% in 1990 or 2000. As a result of this removal, all individuals who 
fell into neither the “White” nor the “Hispanic” nor the “Black” categories were classified as 
“Other” for this paper. 
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 Once the individual demographic and human capital characteristics were categorized, 
individuals were classified as “police” if their jobs fell into a pool of occupational codes that 
were of interest for observing the impact of on-the-job danger. This category was primarily 
drawn from US Census occupational code 385, including police officers, campus police, and 
investigators. The category distinction was drawn to isolate individuals who would be at risk 
of exposure to on-the-job danger from work in the field. 
 Finally, from the data available from IPUMS and the job description categories 
available on the Census Bureau’s website, a comparable job category called “administration” 
was created. This category was created for comparisons to be drawn with any observed 
qualities for individuals in the “police” job category. Individuals qualified for the 
“administration” category if their job was classified as administrative or secretarial in the 
occupational codes. These individuals were chosen as a comparable control groups because 
their jobs were assumed to be relatively isolated from on-the-job danger that would change 
as a result of local violent crime rates. In addition, these jobs were thought to be likely to 
follow similar educational returns trends to those of police officers. 
FBI Uniform Crime Reporting 
The second critical source of data for this thesis is the Uniform Crime Reporting 
Statistics publicly available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Uniform Crime 
Reporting Statistics provided statistics to characterize the non-pay aspect of interest for this 
thesis. Violent crime rates per 100,000 residents and murder rates per 100,000 residents were 
both used at different points throughout this thesis to characterize on-the-job danger for 
police in the metropolitan area.  
The figures selected were all chosen from the most local police authority available to 
the metropolitan area. For all of the cities chosen, this authority was the city or metropolitan 
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police force. Any cities that lacked data available for any year between 1985 and 1989 or 
1995 and 1999, inclusive at the extremities, were considered unusable for the purposes of 
this paper. Any individuals left in the sample from these metropolitan areas were removed 
from the data set. This restriction left 41 metropolitan areas with all of the data available to 
use in this paper. The one exception to this rule is that Baltimore did not have murder rates 
available for 1999, but was left in the sample because its residents had been used for all of 
the regression analysis for violent crime total rates earlier in the thesis. 
Once the data was limited to observations from metropolitan areas with data 
available for all years, the averages were taken over the first five-year period (1985-89) for 
observations from the 1990 Census and over the second five-year period (1995-99) for 
observations from the 2000 Census. Again, attention was paid to Baltimore’s murder rates to 
average by dividing by four instead of five for its period two observations. The logarithms of 
these averages were taken so that interpretations of any significance could be drawn in 
relation to a 1% increase in violent crime (or murder) rates in a meaningful way. 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
The final significant data source came from the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the United States. These 
surveys are administered periodically to assess various characteristics and practices of local 
police departments in the United States.  
Using the surveys administered in 1990, values were added to the dataset for the 
demographic composition of the police departments for each metropolitan area as a freeze-
frame of the situation in 1990. Ideally, values from the 2000 survey would be available with 
which to compare these characteristics to assess the impact of increasing or decreasing 
diversity on any of the outcomes of interest. However, the data from the Law Enforcement 
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Management and Administrative Statistics was sporadic and not comparable from year-to-
year in terms of which departments (city vs. county primarily) were surveyed and what data 
was collected.  
Cross-referencing the demographic data with the population demographic data 
available from the Census Bureau, measures could be made for the disparities between Black 
representation in local populations and in local police departments. The same figures could 
be calculated for Hispanic representation. In almost all metropolitan areas, both of these 
groups were significantly underrepresented in police departments, with the average 
underrepresentation for Black populations in their police force being 11% and the average 
underrepresentation for Hispanic populations in their police force being 6%. 
Model 
Putting all of this data together, the model for this paper forms from variables 
expected to be associated with pay levels for police. The model for this thesis is below in 
Equation 4. The predicted log of the hourly wage for an individual in the sample is estimated 
by five input terms. In particular, the dependent variable in Equation 4 represents the natural 
logarithm of hourly earnings for individual i in metropolitan area m and in Census year t. 
The first input term is the demographic and human capital characteristics of the 
individual in the sample. This term includes the individual’s age (proxy for experience), 
educational attainment level, gender, race, and occupational category (police or 
administrative or neither).  
The second term is the impact of local violent crime rates, observed for individuals 
in the full sample, administrative, and police categories. The null hypothesis for this term is 
that the slope would be statistically insignificant from zero for all three groups. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slope is significantly larger than zero for the police group. 
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The third term in the model is the fixed effects for the metropolitan area and for the 
police departments. In this paper, the fixed effects to notice are the demographic disparity 
indicators from the LEMAS surveys and the distinctions between wages that are naturally 
created by different attractions of different cities.  
The fourth term captures the time-fixed effects in this sample. These effects range 
from what stage of the business cycle in which these samples were taken from the Census 
Bureau to general increases in wages throughout the period of observation. 
The fifth term is the error resulting from unobserved variations in the individual, 
metropolitan area, and time period characteristics that also impact individual wages. This 
term is expected to have a large impact because so much of the impact of wage data is not 
captured in this paper. 𝐸𝑞 4.     log (ℎ𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)!"# =  𝛽𝑥!"# +  𝛾𝐶!" + 𝛼! +  𝜋! +  𝜖!"# 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Data 
 The data for this paper is sourced from IPUMS, the Uniform Crime Reporting 
Statistics from the FBI, and the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
surveys from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The tables in this section display OLS 
regression outcomes for significance of slopes for each independent variable listed while 
holding the others constant. In every regression run, the errors were clustered by year and by 
metropolitan area. In addition, indexing was performed to account for much of the 
metropolitan fixed effects on wages from local conditions. 
 In Table 1 below, the first interacted regression yields statistically significant slopes 
for public employees in the full sample selected for this paper at all increasing levels of age 
(proxy for experience from Census data) and educational attainment. The omitted group for 
experience level is the age group 25-29 and the omitted educational attainment group is 
individuals with education levels less than a high school diploma. To clarify what the specific 
values indicate, the first listed slope under “Public Employees” in Row 1 is 0.114, meaning 
that individuals in this sample earning 11.4% more for having an experience level in the age 
window of 30-34 years when compared with individuals aged 25-29. In addition, this value is 
statistically significant from zero at a 5% level so the slope is marked with two asterisks. In 
fact with a standard error – listed parenthetically below the slope – of 0.007, the significance 
level for this slope estimate is significant at a 1% level as well.  
 Critical to Table 1 is that the slope estimates under “Police Extra” is the deviation 
for individuals in the sample marked as “police.” These individuals are specified in Chapter 
Three according to restrictions made to focus on individuals most likely to fit the goal of this 
paper – to assess the wages of police individuals in relation to on-the-job danger. In a 
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separate table, police totals will be compared with those of other occupational groups, but 
for Table 1, the focus is on the deviations of police pay from the returns and calculations of 
pay for other occupations in the same public, local and state sector of the economy.  
TABLE 1 
LOGHRWAGE With All & Interactions 
(N = 331,749) 
Public Employees Police Extra 
1. Age 30-34 0.114**  
(0.007) 
0.020  
(0.019) 
2. Age 35-39 0.204**  
(0.008) 
0.045**  
(0.022) 
3. Age 40-44 0.248**  
(0.009) 
0.051**  
(0.022) 
4. Age 45-49 0.301**  
(0.009) 
-0.010  
(0.024) 
5. Age 50-54 0.332**  
(0.010) 
-0.021 
(0.024) 
6. Age 55-59 0.334**  
(0.010) 
-0.067* 
(0.035) 
7. HS Diploma 0.154**  
(0.010) 
0.075* 
(0.042) 
8. Some College 0.293**  
(0.009) 
0.072 
(0.047) 
9. Bachelors 0.520**  
(0.009) 
-0.063 
(0.047) 
10. Grad School 0.717**  
(0.010) 
-0.200** 
(0.053) 
11. Black -0.026**  
(0.009) 
-0.084** 
(0.017) 
12. Hispanic -0.063**  
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
13. Other_Race -0.071**  
(0.009) 
-0.060 
(0.043) 
14. Female -0.213**  
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.021) 
15. Year 2000 0.275**  
(0.005) 
0.150** 
(0.021) 
16. Log_Avg_ViolCrimeRt 0.019  
(0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.025) 
17. Police 0.183  
(0.189) 
X 
X 
18. Black_Gap 0.036**  
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
19. Hispanic_Gap -0.047** 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
In Table 2, the same figures and regression form the table, but lists the summed 
slope for police officers instead of listing the “Police Extra” to compare police to the group 
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next to each other. The left column lists the slopes for each of the independent variables for 
the regression for the entire sample, including police. The right column lists the same but for 
just the police in the sample. 
TABLE 2 
LOGHRWAGE With All & Interactions 
(N = 331,749) 
Public Employees Police 
1. Age 30-34 0.114**  
(0.007) 
0.134** 
2. Age 35-39 0.204**  
(0.008) 
0.249** (+) 
 
3. Age 40-44 0.248**  
(0.009) 
0.299** (+) 
 
4. Age 45-49 0.301**  
(0.009) 
0.291** 
 
5. Age 50-54 0.332**  
(0.010) 
0.311** 
 
6. Age 55-59 0.334**  
(0.010) 
0.267** 
 
7. HS Diploma 0.154**  
(0.010) 
0.079** 
 
8. Some College 0.293**  
(0.009) 
0.221** 
 
9. Bachelors 0.520**  
(0.009) 
0.457** 
10. Grad School 0.717**  
(0.010) 
0.517** (-) 
 
11. Black -0.026**  
(0.009) 
-0.110** (-) 
12. Hispanic -0.063**  
(0.012) 
-0.043** 
 
13. Other_Race -0.071**  
(0.009) 
-0.131** 
 
14. Female -0.213**  
(0.007) 
0.213** 
15. Year 2000 0.275**  
(0.005) 
0.425** 
 
16. Log_Avg_ViolCrimeRt 0.019  
(0.022) 
-0.003 
17. Police 0.183  
(0.189) 
0.183 
 
18. Black_Gap 0.036**  
(0.006) 
0.036** 
 
19. Hispanic_Gap -0.047** 
(0.005) 
-0.049** 
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 In Table 3 below, the impacts and returns for pay are included separately for men 
and for women to observe any potential distinctions in the returns to experience, education, 
or the potential compensating wage differential for danger paid to each group. 
TABLE 3 
 
LOGHRWAGE 
With All & Police Interactions 
(N = 141,456) 
Male 
With All & Police Interactions 
(N = 190,293) 
Female 
Full Sample Police Extra Full Sample Police Extra 
1. Age 30-34 0.140**  
(0.09) 
0.003  
(0.023) 
0.100** 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.039) 
2. Age 35-39 0.262**  
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.030) 
0.169** 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
3. Age 40-44 0.334**  
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.030) 
0.197** 
(0.009) 
-0.022 
(0.040) 
4. Age 45-49 0.397**  
(0.012) 
-0.079** 
(0.030) 
0.247** 
(0.008) 
-0.078** 
(0.036) 
5. Age 50-54 0.428**  
(0.014) 
-0.088** 
(0.030) 
0.281** 
(0.011) 
-0.093** 
(0.043) 
6. Age 55-59 0.428**  
(0.013) 
-0.133** 
(0.046) 
0.288** 
(0.010) 
-0.115** 
(0.048) 
7. HS Diploma 0.179**  
(0.011) 
0.072 
(0.055) 
0.152** 
(0.011) 
0.062 
(0.081) 
8. Some College 0.302**  
(0.011) 
0.082 
(0.059) 
0.300** 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.084) 
9. Bachelors 0.415**  
(0.010) 
0.040 
(0.062) 
0.600** 
(0.012) 
-0.165** 
(0.079) 
10. Grad School 0.576**  
(0.010) 
-0.046 
(0.059) 
0.825** 
(0.014) 
-0.413** 
(0.129) 
11. Black -0.124** 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.040** 
(0.008) 
-0.098** 
(0.029) 
12. Hispanic -0.067**  
(0.014) 
0.057** 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
13. Other -0.112** 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.048) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.055 
(0.058) 
14. Female X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
15. Year 2000 0.250**  
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.290** 
(0.06) 
0.325** 
(0.023) 
16. Log_Avg_ViolCrmRt 0.032** 
(0.024) 
-0.040 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
0.015 
(0.029) 
17. Police 0.435* 
(0.261) 
X 
X 
-0.099 
(0.208) 
X 
X 
18. Black_Gap 0.040**  
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.036** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
19. Hispanic_Gap -0.047** 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.047** 
(0.005) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
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 Table 4 is the primary data table for the thesis. In this data table, the variables of 
interest were interacted with the two occupational codes to demonstrate any deviations 
specific to these two occupations. The goal of this table is observe police pay characteristics 
in the context of other public-sector local occupations with similar requirements, but no 
direct exposure to violent crime rates. 
TABLE 4 
LOGHRWAGE OLS Regression with Metropolitan Index 
(N = 331,749 & 82 Clusters for S.E) 
 Full Sample Admin Extra Police Extra 
1. Age 30-34 0.119**  
(0.006) 
-0.019*  
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.019) 
2. Age 35-39 0.216**  
(0.007) 
-0.042** 
(0.014) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
3. Age 40-44 0.260**  
(0.007) 
-0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.037 
(0.022) 
4. Age 45-49 0.316** 
(0.007) 
-0.074** 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
5. Age 50-54 0.348**  
(0.009) 
-0.089** 
(0.016) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
6. Age 55-59 0.351**  
(0.009) 
-0.087** 
(0.012) 
-0.082** 
(0.034) 
7. HS Diploma 0.141**  
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.029) 
0.085** 
(0.042) 
8. Some College 0.274**  
(0.007) 
-0.044 
(0.032) 
0.087* 
(0.047) 
9. Bachelors 0.526**  
(0.009) 
-0.195** 
(0.035) 
-0.067 
(0.046) 
10. Grad School 0.725**  
(0.010) 
-0.216** 
(0.027) 
-0.200** 
(0.052) 
11. Black -0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.031** 
(0.011) 
-0.087** 
(0.017) 
12. Hispanic -0.062**  
(0.012) 
0.043** 
(0.011) 
0.025* 
(0.013) 
13. Other_Race -0.066** 
(0.009) 
0.037 
(0.023) 
-0.052 
(0.042) 
14. Female -0.196**  
(0.005) 
-0.080** 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
15. Year 2000 0.299**  
(0.005) 
-0.146** 
(0.014) 
0.224** 
(0.017) 
16. Log_Avg_ViolentCrimeRt 0.011 
(0.021) 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
 
	 25	
 Table 5 covers the next two pages with the same comparisons as Table 4, but divided 
to focus on the distinctions between White, Black, and Hispanic individuals and to include 
indicators for the predictive input of the gap indicators for demographic representation of 
minority groups in the police department. These values are indicated in columns 16 and 17. 
For clarification, the variable “Black Gap” refers to the percentage of the police department 
that is Black minus the percentage of the population that is Black. The same description but 
for Hispanic individuals and officers describes the variable “Hispanic Gap.” 
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TABLE 5 
O
LS w
ith 
M
etropolitan 
Index 
(N
 =
 61,474 
&
 82 
C
lusters) 
Black 
O
LS w
ith 
M
etropolitan 
Index 
(N
 =
 28,023 
&
 82 
C
lusters) 
H
ispanic 
O
LS w
ith 
M
etropolitan 
Index 
(N
 =
 230,581 
&
 82 
C
lusters) 
W
hite, N
on-
H
ispanic 
L
O
G
H
R
W
A
G
E
 
Full 
A
dm
in 
Police 
Full 
A
dm
in 
Police 
Full 
A
dm
in 
Police 
0.100**  
(0.012) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.038 
(0.037) 
0.098** 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.031) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
0.123** 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
1.  
A
ge 30-34 
0.201**  
(0.011) 
-0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
0.167** 
(0.013) 
0.043 
(0.035) 
0.110** 
(0.044) 
0.222** 
(0.008) 
-0.041** 
(0.015) 
0.039* 
(0.034) 
2.  
A
ge 35-39 
0.237**  
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.031) 
0.033 
(0.039) 
0.200** 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.031) 
0.108** 
(0.051) 
0.269** 
(0.008) 
-0.043** 
(0.016) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
3.  
A
ge 40-44 
0.315**  
(0.013) 
-0.103** 
(0.027) 
-0.114** 
(0.043) 
0.240** 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.041) 
0.077* 
(0.043) 
0.322** 
(0.008) 
-0.068** 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
4.  
A
ge 45-49 
0.328**  
(0.015) 
-0.085** 
(0.030) 
-0.081* 
(0.045) 
0.262** 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.059) 
-0.050 
(0.084) 
0.359** 
(0.009) 
-0.093** 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
5.  
A
ge 50-54 
0.339**  
(0.017) 
-0.163** 
(0.033) 
-0.177** 
(0.071) 
0.247** 
(0.016) 
0.031 
(0.047) 
-0.022 
(0.091) 
0.360** 
(0.009) 
-0.073** 
(0.015) 
-0.050 
(0.041) 
6.  
A
ge 55-59 
0.129**  
(0.013) 
0.041 
(0.037) 
0.103 
(0.085) 
0.188** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.057) 
0.272* 
(0.151) 
0.111** 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.028) 
0.010 
(0.052) 
7. 
H
S 
D
iplom
a 
0.253**  
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.047) 
0.091 
(0.088) 
0.302** 
(0.014) 
-0.031 
(0.063) 
0.329** 
(0.133) 
0.249** 
(0.010) 
-0.047* 
(0.028) 
-0.013 
(0.055) 
8.  
Som
e 
C
ollege 	
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Findings 
From the data in the tables from OLS regressions performed to create Chapter Four, 
there are five primary takeaways. 
The first main takeaway is the absence of an observed compensating wage 
differential for any police demographic. As shown in Table 4, the full sample, police and 
administrative individuals did not experience an increase in pay for an increase in violent 
crime rates at the 5% significance level. In fact, the only group to experience an increase 
statistically significant at the 10% level was the administrative group, chosen to be the 
control group least exposed to on-the-job danger. 
The second takeaway from this data is the dramatic increase in police wages, even 
controlling for general increase in wages in this sector of the economy as well, that occurred 
from 1990 to 2000. While wages in the local and state public employees included in the 
sample rose by an average of 29.9% according to Row 15 in Table 4, police salaries rose 
22.4% on top of that already high amount. That means that police salaries rose 52.3% on 
average from 1990 to 2000. For comparison, individuals in administrative positions only saw 
their salaries increase by 15.3% over the same interval. 
The third takeaway from the data in Chapter Four is the lack of variation between 
demographic groups for the possible observance of a compensating wage differential as well. 
While the returns to education and experience for police officers vary between White, Black, 
and Hispanic individuals, with White individuals receiving higher returns to experience at 
every age group and most educational attainments, there were no distinctions in terms of 
compensating wage differentials for officers of different demographic characteristics – 
including race and gender. 
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The fourth takeaway from this thesis is that there was not a significant difference in 
the slopes and still no observed compensating wage differential for police when murder rates 
were used as the indicator for danger instead of total violent crime rates.  
The fifth takeaway is that the gap statistics observed are statistically significant in the 
regressions. These measures do not vary significantly for white/black/Hispanic police and 
carry through for all occupations in the local and state public sector – i.e. police are not 
special in this sense.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Implications and Limitations 
This thesis has a number of general shortcomings. In each regression this paper has 
run, roughly 30% of the variation in logarithm of the hourly wage has been explained by the 
variation in the included x variables, indicating a need for significant caution when drawing 
conclusions from the data available. In selecting individuals to correspond with violent crime 
rates for major cities in the United States, I was only able to reliably pinpoint individuals to 
their metropolitan area from the data available from the Censuses of 1990 and 2000. This 
overlap inconsistency between city and metropolitan area for data association could have 
muddied the waters for local impact because many suburban areas included in major 
metropolitan areas are actually insulated from the city’s violent crime rates. 
The first finding in Chapter Five is the lack of an observed compensating wage 
differential in the data observed. While some of this may be due to the fact that there was an 
overlap issue in the data available from IPUMS, much of this observation may be from 
individuals with high abilities self-selecting into safer areas over the interval for the paper. 
These individuals would be receiving higher wages for their higher skills, but would be 
concentrated in areas with lower violent crime rates. It is possible that with the attention to 
high violent crime rates around the interval of this paper many individuals could have made 
this selection. A potential further direction in finding a compensating wage differential for 
police could involve more detailed observations and attempts at including police skill in the 
model. Perhaps arrest rates could be an indication of abilities.   
This paper’s second finding about the discrepancies in the wage increases between 
1990 and 2000 for individuals in the different occupational categories is perhaps the most 
interesting statistic in Table 4. This discrepancy may be the result of the 1994 Violent Crime 
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Prevention and Law Enforcement Act, passed under President Clinton during the year of 
the highest violent crime rates in many of the major cities in the United States, according to 
FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. 
Chapter Five’s third finding addresses one of the primary goals of this thesis in 
discovering any fine differences between police pay determinants for officers of different 
demographic groups. Even by observing no compensating wage differential for the sample 
as a whole, it could have been the case that preferences were different among groups or that 
discrimination forced different individuals to accept a higher or lower compensating wage 
differential, which could have been statistically significant for one of the groups observed. 
However, it was not so. The only significant difference for police in Table 5 is the 8% lower 
wage for Black police officers when compared to their already discriminatorily lower pay in 
the full sample. As a possible new direction, research could dive into finer details to see if 
there are any more specific groups that do receive an observed compensating wage 
differential.  
In addressing the fourth finding of this paper, it is possible that neither murder nor 
total violent crime rates were the proper indictor for police considerations of on-the-job 
danger. It would be helpful to see additional research performed that highlights risks such as 
police-involved shootings or maybe gender-based focuses on the impacts of rape statistics 
on police pay with a broader range of cities used on a larger scale to see any noticeable 
impacts that may exist.  
In interpreting the fifth finding from Chapter Five, explanations could range from 
the belief that police representation can act as a proxy for local representation to regional 
demographic differences. Since there were no statistically significant across the board and 
that there is unequal tax collection and distribution across the board or the – much more 
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likely – explanation that this was observed from omitted variable bias of locational trends of 
minority population concentrations (need a high concentration to be massively 
underrepresented on a police force). This explanation is much less compelling than the 
regional differences explanation, however.  
First, the differences observed exist not just in the police departments. Second, 
having a highly unrepresentative police department in this paper requires a high floor of the 
minority population, which disproportionately occurred in lower-income areas in general for 
Black populations, particularly in Southern cities and in higher-income areas for Hispanic 
populations, particularly on the West Coast. Third, . Therefore, it is more plausible that these 
observed disparities are an issue of improper accounting for endogeneity with the population 
distributions in the metropolitan areas or omitted variable bias for regional importance in 
addition to specific metropolitan characteristics. 
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